MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
L. A. POWE, JR.*
I
INTRODUCTION

Mass communications issues have traditionally been slighted or ignored in
first amendment writings, and, when recognized, they have been treated as a
subset of the larger problem of freedom of expression. In large part, this
stems from the instant establishment of the dominant first amendment
paradigm of the lonely political dissenter. It was also assisted by the lack of
significant newspaper cases (even the Los Angeles Times-Mirror was attached to
Harry Bridges's claim') and the initial inability to perceive movies, then radio
and television, as being integral to the first amendment. 2 Yet like it or not,
mass communications have become the essential component of the way we
choose our elected representatives and establish the nation's agendas.
When the typical speech cases involved reds, pinks, blacks, and the likes of
Fanny Hill, it was all too easy for academics to ignore the harm that expression
may cause. Commies did not look as ferocious to many scholars after the fall
of Joseph McCarthy as they did to Chief Justice Vinson during the Korean
War. Any harms flowing from civil rights speech were not harms at all, but
the necessary benefits of acquiring a just order. And obscenity, the nonpolitical triad of the first amendment docket, was, during its formative period,
very tame stuff, being countered by laws and attitudes that dated from the
Victorian era; believing in harms from its existence had all the credibility that
fundamentalists could impart. Overall, the cases offered a gloss on the first
amendment suggesting, as Brandeis had, 3 that more speech was always better
and that the claims of societal harm were the rear guard professions of those
fighting to preserve the remnants of the Taft Wing of the Republican Party (as
4
Douglas came close to doing).
The problem with that picture is the trivialization of the first amendment,
whose purpose then becomes largely to prevent the misbalancing of relevant
interests. It should-and does-mean more. Thanks in no small part to Fred
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Schauer's many writings 5 and then to the anguished cries of victims of hate
speech, 6 virtually everyone writing today in the first amendment area
understands, as their academic elders seemed not to, that speech hurts.
Because speech may inflict genuine harm, there is a legitimate impetus toward
efforts at redress.

No one dealing with issues of mass communications could doubt that
speech at times causes harm. When CBS causes a distinguished military
veteran, such as General William Westmoreland, to assure audiences that he
is not a traitor, 7 or when the Miami Herald drives the front-running
Democratic presidential contender in 1988, Gary Hart, out of contention for
the presidency, 8 there can be no doubt that words have real consequences.
The media are powerful speakers-the largest distributors (if not
contributors) to the marketplace of ideas-and they reach audiences beyond
the dreams of a Debs, 9 Abrams, t0 Gitlow, 1t or Cohen.' 2 Whatever the
overworked term means, major newspapers and broadcasters appear to
possess tremendous "power." Now that academics in the speech area have
taken account of expression's genuine harms and may soon be forced to deal
with issues of power as well, the analogies offered by mass communications
cases to these new issues ought to make them look a little less like an
insignificant subset of the first amendment's concerns.
Instead of perceiving mass communications as a subset of freedom of
speech, I am going to keep company with the Framers (who came to the
protection of freedom of speech well after freedom of the press)' 3 and assume
the centrality of the press. This makes present-day factual sense-flagburners to the contrary notwithstanding-because modern politics cannot be
meaningfully discussed without mass marketing. Additionally, it makes
theoretical sense because, however distasteful it is, some speakers have more
influence, rightly or wrongly, in the marketplace. Because of both power and
potential harm, the mass communications cases (as opposed to other speech
5. Frederick F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (Cambridge U Press, 1982);
Frederick F. Schauer, The Second Best First Amendment, 31 Wm & Mary L Rev 1 (1989); Frederick F.
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw U L Rev 1284 (1984).
6. See, for example Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racial Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 Mich L Rev 2320 (1989).
7. L. A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution: Freedom of the Press in America 137 (U
California Press, 1991).
8. Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy 76-79 (Free Press, 1991).
9. Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919)(convicted for attempting to cause insubordination by
a speech on socialism at an outdoor rally expressing opposition to Prussian militarism in a way that
might be thought to include the United States).
10. Abrams v United States, 250 US 616 (1919)(convicted for advocating curtailment of military
production with intent to harm the United States in the war against Germany by advocating a strike
because of the United States's invasion of Russia).
11. Gitlou v N.ew York, 268 US 652 (1925)(convicted for advocating communism because a
revolutionary spark at the present could kindle a sweeping conflagration sometime in the future).
12. Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971)(jacket emblazoned with "Fuck the Draft"
constitutionally protected in a courthouse; those offended may avert their eyes).
13. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 42-50 (cited in note 7); David A. Anderson, Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L Rev 455, 464-65 (1983).
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cases) have an interesting split between the regulation of harm and the
regulation of the marketplace, a split that helps clarify the dilemmas facing
first amendment theorists.14
II
THE REGULATION OF HARMS

Although it is not entirely accurate, harms from speech, consistent with the
mode of expression, generally tend to be more specific, while harms from
mass communications, again consistent with the mode of expression, tend to
be more general. In the former, harm is typically demonstrable; either the
words have wounded the audience or caused the audience to take action
against someone or something.' 5 Cantwell's attack on Catholicism either
caused or did not cause a breach of the peace by the addressee.' 6 In mass
communications cases, by contrast, the harm is likely to be shared more
universally, as when military secrets are published. Libel and privacy are
obvious exceptions, but even there the concern over the torts would be
significantly lessened if the harm to the body politic were removed.
A.

National Security

For all the talk about national security and the harm a serious breach could
inflict, the United States has never adopted anything similar to Great Britain's
Official Secrets Act, which criminalizes the disclosure of classified
information. 17 Instead, there are only a few statutes and a few litigated cases
that deal with the public disclosure of sensitive information.' 8 Describing the
statutes, former CIA Director William Colby stated that Congress had
"drawn a line between espionage for a foreign power and simple disclosure of
14. The categories of harm and the balancing of the market are not airtight, of course. Punitive
damages in libel cases may have less to do with redressing harm than redressing market power.
Jerome A. Barron, Punitive Damages in Libel Cases-First Amendment Equalizer?, 47 Wash & Lee L Rev
105 (1990). The radical feminist attack on pornography argues that pornography creates and
reinforces the dominant viewpoint of patriarchy. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified:
Discourses on Life and Law 155-56 (Harvard U Press, 1987). Indeed, the lack of fit between typical
harm and the sweep of the definition of pornography stems precisely from a desire to redress the
imbalance in the marketplace by silencing the predominant voice of male dominance. Michigan's
campaign finance statute was justified in terms of a harm, a newly created definition of corruption,
rather than the equalitarian benefits of leveling down. The World War I Espionage Act cases, Schenk
v United States, 249 US 47 (1919); Frohwerk v United States, 249 US 204 (1919); Debs, 249 US 211; and
Abrams, 250 US 616, could be rewritten in terms of the speakers' efforts to counter the market power
of the Creel Committee's propaganda machinery, Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics,
Law, and Government Expression in America 62-64 (U California Press, 1983); Stephen Vaughn, Holding
Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information (U North Carolina
Press, 1980), but there is little reason to do so. The Court has worked with the harm principle for
almost a century and is quite familiar with its boundaries even as the paradigm cases have receded
into insignificance.
15. Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 568 (195 1)(Jackson concurring).
16. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940).
17. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 173 (cited in note 7).
18. See, for example, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 USC §§ 2014(y)(1), 2274, 2277 (1989);
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 USC § 421 (1989); United States v 1lorison, 844 F2d
1057 (4th Cir 1988).
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our foreign policy and defense secrets, and decided that the latter problems
are an acceptable cost of the kind of society we prefer."' 9
Colby's observation should be tempered slightly. First, there is the
problem of conversion of government property; section 641 of the United
States Criminal Code criminalizes the unauthorized taking of anything "of
value." 2 0 On its face this statute appears extremely broad. Second, the line
that Colby articulated is reflected in section 794 of the Espionage Act, 2 ' but
its companion, section 793, goes considerably further by prohibiting
disclosure of covered information to unauthorized persons. 2 2 While this
makes section 793 sound like an Official Secrets Act, it is not because it is
aimed at the source, not at those who subsequently publish the information.
Third, there are regulations, specifically those promulgated by the CIA, that
preclude those persons with access to classified information from disclosing
such information without permission. 23 Behind this meager statutory and
regulatory authority, however, there is little else: perhaps the possibility of an
injunction prior to publication, and, in extreme cases, the threat of treason.
National security has often been seen as the only time the government is
likely to breach successfully the first amendment barrier against prior
restraints. While this is not entirely accurate, 24 there is no doubt that the
national security exception to prior restraints is the most interesting facet of
the prior restraints doctrine. The exception, created in dicta in Near v.
Minnesota,2 5 was, of course, put to issue in the leak of the forty-seven volume
Pentagon Papers,2 6 but the Court rather blandly found that the steep showing
of immediate harm required to justify an injunction had not been met. In
contrast, when Howard Morland used his own ingenuity and unclassified
sources to explain how an H-bomb worked, a federal district judge, noting the
extreme dangers of allowing certain third world countries to acquire this
information, did issue an injunction. 2 7 Yet there was no claim that any
"immediate" harm would occur, as the Pentagon Papers Cases had required. As
with Dennis v. United States, 28 the trial judge found that the gravity of the harm
could push the requirement of immediacy into the background.
The H-Bomb case was then mooted when an alternative source published
the same information. 2 9 That outcome underscored a reality of the problem
19.
20.

Powe, The Fourth Estate at 173 (cited in note 7).
18 USC § 641 (1989) (conversion).
21. Id § 794 (disclosure of sensitive information to foreign nations).
22. Id § 793 (disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons).
23. See Snepp v United States, 444 US 507 (1980).
24. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 149-50, 161-63 (cited in note 7).
25. 283 US 697, 716 (193 1)("[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the
Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous
restraints or censorship.").
26. Aew York Times v United States, 403 US 713 (197 1).
27. United States v The Progressive, Inc., 467 F Supp 990, 997 (WD Wis 1979) (holding prior
restraint appropriate because a single H-bomb even in the future would ruin your whole day).
28. 341 US 494; see also L. A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U Colo L Rev 55, 60 (1990).
29. United States v The Progressive, Inc., 610 F2d 819 (7th Cir 1979)(dismissing the publisher's
appeal without a published opinion).
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of injunctive relief to prevent a supposed national security breach: copying
machines and computer discs have made prior restraints virtually obsolete
because the materials will almost always show up somewhere else. The
injunction itself places such an imperative on someone publishing the now
illicit-and (rightly or wrongly) tantalizing-material that one can rest assured
that it will surface. While this new reality is not yet reflected in the prior
restraints doctrine, the government necessarily will be forced to rely on
30
criminal sanctions if it wishes to deter publication in the future.
Aside from prior restraints, criminal law on publications remains muddled
indeed. Despite upholding the press in every single "privacy" case and in
other, noncopyright contexts where it has published truthful information
noncoercively obtained from government sources, the Court has avoided
sweeping rules and assumed that somewhere down the line may lie a situation
where the press ought not publish. 3 ' Maybe the Court, sub silentio, does have a
rule protecting the press in noncoercive acquisition cases, but not delineating
the rule leaves the potential deterrent of criminal penalties hanging as a very
last incentive to encourage good citizenship (as the New York Times displayed
in its choices of what not to publish out of the Pentagon Papers). 32 Justice
Stewart, if not the Court, explicitly suggested this approach,3 3 and past
practice indicates that it will likely take a blockbuster disclosure before
sanctions against the press, rather than the actual source, could be
34
constitutionally permissible.
Surprising as it may seem, defacto press immunity receives support from
both recent legislation and prosecutorial practices. The Intelligence
Identities Protection Act of 1982 covers anyone, including the press, who,
"with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information
that identifies an individual as a covert agent. ' ' 5 However, it includes an
important proviso: such disclosures must evince a "pattern of activities
intended to identify or expose covert agents." 36 The proviso thus appears to
limit the operation of the law to publications such as the "Covert Action
Information Bulletin," 3 7 and thereby ignore the regular press.
It has been almost twenty years and five administrations since Branzburg v.
Hayes38 held that there is no general first amendment privilege for reporters
who wish to protect their confidential sources. Yet there has not been a single
30. Powe, 61 U Colo L Rev at 69-70 (cited in note 28).
31. See, for example, Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 US 524, 530 (1989).
32. The supposedly harmful material cited in the government's secret brief has never been
revealed.
33. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 Hastings L J 631, 635-36 (1975).
34. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 177 (cited in note 7).
35. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, § i, codified at 50 USC § 421(c).
36. Id.
37. This was Philip Agee's vehicle for blowing the cover of CIA agents in the field. See note 42
and accompanying text.
38. 408 US 665 (1972).
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subpoena to trace an inside-the-Beltway leak of information,3 9 a fact that,
when contrasted with the press's fears that Branzburg would result in sources
drying up, 40 speaks volumes about the realization by all involved that
information for public debate is essential-even when the information is
highly classified. Nor has any administration indicted the press for disclosing
sensitive information-not even the Progressive, whose H-bomb article and
accompanying diagram failed to match the discretion exhibited by the New
York Times when they published the Pentagon Papers. By contrast, though,
Daniel Ellsberg was indicted for leaking the Pentagon Papers; Samuel Loring
Morison was convicted for leaking a satellite photo and defense briefing to
Jane's Defense Weekly; 4 ' and Philip Agee lost his passport after he persistently
42
identified CIA agents in the field.

Few observers would argue, and no court would likely agree, that there is a
wholesale first amendment right to disclose secret information. Yet
disclosure-leaking information-is a way of life in the nation's capital, and
there seems to be general agreement that without leaks it would be impossible
to uiderstand modern government (especially diplomacy and national
security). 4 3 Sometimes the leak is designed to kill a program; naturally, the
disclosure thereby gains the enmity of an administration that wishes to pursue
the program without the negative information in the public arena. 4 4 But a
large number of leaks are a matter of official policy (and if official enough, not
a "leak" in the pejorative sense, but a purposeful and legitimate disclosure).
For example, as the estimated final cost of the B-2 Stealth Bomber rocketed
upward, the Reagan Administration and the Pentagon found that there was
reluctance to purchase any airplane that cost over a half-billion dollars per
plane. To create support, the B-2 almost literally overnight went from the
most highly classified weapons program to the subject of photographs on
45
newspapers' front pages.
The operations of all three branches of government have authorized the
press to disclose the information it acquires: Congress, both by what it has
not passed and by the lines drawn in the statutes it has passed, the executive,
by the tradition of not subpoenaing reporters and not prosecuting
newspapers for security leaks, and the judiciary, by declining prior restraints
and protecting the press when the issue has been disclosure of information.
The operative outcomes can be explained in terms of a very particularistic
view of causation. It is the leaker, not the reporter or the newspaper, who
causes any harm to the national interest. While such a view of causation is
39. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 184 (cited in note 7). The frivolous and futile effort to obtain the
name of the Anita Hill leaker from the press occurred as this article went to press.
40. Theodore H. White, l'hy the Jailing of ,,yron Farber "'Terrifies ele,
' NY Times Magazine 27
(Nov 28, 1978); Monica Langley & Lee Levine, "Branzburg" Revisited: Confidential Sources and First
Amendment 'alues, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 13 (1988).
41. M.orison, 844 F2d 1057.
42. Haig v Agee, 453 US 280 (1980).
43. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 177-78 (cited in note 7).
44. See generally Martin Linsky, Impact (W.W. Norton, 1986).
45. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 171 (cited in note 7).
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unlikely to be found in modern common law analysis, it is a fairly standard
first amendment analysis: 46 the Court has simply disengaged speech from
subsequent (punishable) action. In the mass communications area, the same
process is at work in reverse. The harm is treated as occurring first and the
publication is protected by treating it as separate and after the point of
actionable harm.
Laurence Tribe sees this area as operating under a "rough 'law of the
jungle.' -47 The leaker is, if necessary, fed to the animals so that the stronger
newspaper will survive. Everyone in this jungle from leaker to president
understands that sensitive information will enter the public arena, that it may
(but probably does not) harm the national interest, but that without the
information the government has too many ways to manipulate debate to
achieve its own ends. The Court's narrow view of causation, focusing on the
initial disclosure rather than its mass distribution, pinpoints a culprit who can
be punished with the minimum damage to public debate and the easiest
explanation in first amendment terms. After all, it is vastly easier to
understand that publishing information in your possession is an exercise of
freedom of the press than to grasp that either pilfering documents or
disclosing confidences in breach of positions of trust is an exercise of freedom
of speech. By focusing on the leaker and not the press, the Court
simultaneously authorizes a more informed public discussion, minimizes any
chill, and still leaves the opportunity to assign blame. With the end of the
Cold War, a preliminary assessment would appear to be that the Court's de
facto balance worked reasonably well.
B.

Fair Administration of Justice

At least some of the foregoing was placed at issue by the temporary
restraining order issued by a federal judge to prevent the Cable News
Network ("CNN") from airing tapes it had been given containing telephone
conversations between Manuel Noriega and his attorneys. 48 While trial
judges have occasionally been unduly sensitive to published reports about
cases they are handling, the Supreme Court's unblemished record from
Bridges and Times-Mirror through Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 49 gives trial
judges no leeway (albeit, as in Noriega, the Court did not intervene at the
earliest stages of this litigation). The only times the press has been found to
have prejudiced a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial have been
where the trial judges mistakenly have turned the courtroom over to the
media, as in Sheppard50 and Estes. 5 1 Otherwise, it is not too difficult to find
twelve jury members who have never heard of the defendant, be he Oliver
46. Jack Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 Va L Rev 197, 254-61 (1990).
47. Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 965 (Foundation Press, 2d ed 1988).
48. CNN Gives Up Voriega Tapes to Federal Court in Florida, NY Times B9 col 1 (Nov 20, 1990).
49. 427 US 539 (1976).
50. Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966).
51. Estes v Texas, 381 US 532 (1966).
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North or Manuel Noriega. The right to a fair trial therefore, for the most part,
cannot be prejudiced by publication.
The real alleged harm from CNN airing the Noriega tapes was the breach
of attorney-client privilege. While the airing may do more than prejudice
potential jurors, it is still speculative because (1) Noriega might be acquitted;
(2) prosecutors might successfully isolate themselves from the disclosures; (3)
the taped discussions might not have anything to do with what would
eventually occur at trial; or (4) the tapes may discuss only things the
government already knows, such as the identity of government witnesses. To
be sure, the judge needed the temporary restraint to acquire a less speculative
estimate of harm, but given the likely ambiguity of the harm, the Supreme
Court's prior restraint jurisprudence ought to have precluded even the
temporary order that let the trial judge review the tapes and decide for
himself.

52

After the judge reviewed the tapes, he lifted his order and ended the
unfortunate episode. 5 3 His initial risk aversion was understandable:
Noriega's trial is the biggest of his career. Nevertheless, CNN had acquired
the tapes legally, did not prejudice the case, and added information to a
continuing debate about the consequences of invading Panama. Those facts
highlight why editors, rather than judges, should decide whether to publish.
C.

Libel

Libel, once thought by all but Harry Kalven to raise no constitutional
issues, 54 has been an exceptionally active area of constitutional debate for the
past quarter century. With a $500,000 award to Montgomery Commissioner
L. B. Sullivan 55 and millions of dollars more at stake in similar suits, Alabama
had apparently found a method to counterattack northern pressure, one that
carried with it the potential to bankrupt the then less financially secure New
York Times. 5 6 The Court countered with its requirement that before a public
official could prevail in a libel action, the official must show that the press
published the information either knowing it was false or with reckless
disregard of its validity. Despite its promise to balance successfully the
interests of reputation against the chilling effect that civil liability imposes on
the press, over the years the law of defamation has become an ever more
intricate maze of rules that accomplish none of its objectives. Like the Holy
Roman Empire, which many have observed was neither holy, Roman, nor an
empire, the constitutional rules of libel protect neither reputation, the press,
nor the public's interest in receiving accurate information.
52. US v Noriega, 917 F2d 1543 (11 th Cir 1990), cert denied sub nom Cable News Network v
Noriega, Ill S Ct 451 (1990).
53. US v Noriega, 752 F Supp 1037 (SD Fla 1990).
54. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Mleaning of the First
Amendment, " 1964 S Ct Rev 191, 192 n4 (citing his otherwise unavailable mid-1950s suggestion that
libel involves constitutional issues).
55.
ew York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).
56. James C. Goodale, Is the Public "Getting Even" with the Press in Libel Cases?, 188 NY LJ 1 (1982).

Page 53: Winter 1992]

MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Libel's best known feature may be dividing defamed plaintiffs into two
classes, public and private figures, with only the former having to meet the
New York Times actual malice standard.5 7 Yet that has had little impact on
litigation, because private figures also need to show actual malice to recover
punitive damages, the practical key to finding an attorney willing to take the
case on a contingent fee. At trial, the court rules regarding libel attempt to
58
minimize jury discretion. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity,
and those statements that "cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating
actual facts" are fully protected. 59 There is strict appellate supervision of the
evidence unmatched in any other area of law. 60
In operation, an overwhelming number of libel suits are disposed of prior
to trial; therefore, a plaintiff is never granted a forum in which to show that
the defamatory statements were in fact false. 6 1 If the case goes to a jury, the
odds shift heavily to the plaintiff, although damage awards are likely to be set
aside either by the trial judge or appellate court. 6 2 Rarely do plaintiffs
successfully overcome all the built-in protections designed to protect the
press. 63 As a result, the rules underprotect reputation, do not provide the
public with an opportunity to know the truth about injured plaintiffs, and, in
all likelihood, deter at least some individuals from entering the public arena
64
where, they fear, rightly or wrongly, becoming fair game for unfair media.
Nevertheless, current law also fails to serve the interests of the press. A
wholly unanticipated aspect of New York Times was the way it turned the libel
trial away from the statements of the defendant about the plaintiff, to a
scrutiny of how the press put the story together. The dynamics of a trial
focusing on the practices, care, motives, and views of the press-especially
when, as is likely for a case reaching trial, the story is false-thus invite
punishment of the press. 6 5 A good trial lawyer will be able to paint the
dispute as a contest between good and evil, but the necessary evidence to
prove reckless disregard leaves no doubt which side is evil. Thus, the average
jury award in the 1980s in cases where reckless disregard was found exceeded
66
$2 million.
It does not reduce the chill on newspapers to learn that few plaintiffs get to
keep their awards and that the average successful plaintiff receives a mere
57. Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 342-43 (1974).
58. Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776 (1989).
59. Milkovich v LorainJournal,110 S Ct 2695, 2706 (1990), quoting Hustler Magazine v Falwell, 485
US 46, 53-55 (1987).
60. See Bose Corp. v Consumers Union, 466 US 485, 511 (1984).
61. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 121, 134 (cited in note 7); see also David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law
W
Forth Reforming?, 140 U Pa L Rev 525 (1991).
62. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 119 (cited in note 7).
63. Defense lawyer Robert Sack aptly notes that the "few plaintiffs who succeed resemble the
remnants of an army platoon caught in an enemy crossfire. Their awards stand witness to their good
luck, not to their virtue, their skill or the justice of their cause." Randall Bezanson, Gilbert Crandell
& John Soloski, Libel Law and the Press 199 (Free Press, 1987).
64. Powe, The Fourth Estate at 120 (cited in note 7).
65. Id at 125-27.
66. ld at 127; Anderson, 140 U Pa L Rev at 514 (cited in note 61).
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There seems to be a damages explosion in tort verdicts generally,
and newspapers know catastrophe can arrive with just one huge verdict, such
as the $9 million judgment against the Alton (Illinois) Evening Telegraph, which
sent the newspaper to bankruptcy court (although a subsequent settlement
allowed the 38,000-circulation newspaper to stay in business). 68 What makes
defamation a special tort is that the injury that plaintiffs suffer seems far less
severe than a physical injury to a tort plaintiff. Large jury verdicts, both
punitive damages and those for emotional pain and suffering, are designed
69
more to punish than to compensate.
The operation of New York Times thus has produced a strange landscape.
Issues of truth and falsity rarely surface, and reputations are not cleared for
the vast majority of plaintiffs. For those few that get to a jury, however, trying
the press can lead to a large, albeit only momentary, windfall. The possibility
of that windfall, coupled with the necessary legal fees to avoid it, maintains a
chilling effect on the press even though appellate supervision typically cuts
the amounts of the verdicts considerably. Libel law, having been wholly
remade in the wake of New York Times, needs to be rethought again.
It is not that the Court misunderstood what to balance; rather, its rules
systematically undermine all the values it attempts to protect. Instead of
attempting to make constitutional doctrine evermore intricate as it faced the
inevitable array of common law rules of defamation, the Court should have
remembered the balance with which it began. 70 When newspapers print
defamatory falsehoods, they cause harm that is wholly divorced from the
standard of care. From the perspective of the public generally, there can be
no doubt that the newspaper is more at fault when it publishes with actual
malice, but the plaintiff's reputation is harmed exactly the same even if the
paper published without the slightest fault. Simply, the fault standard is
aimed solely at protecting the press and public from the effects of selfcensorship. It necessarily results in undervaluing reputation. We know there
is harm and we know who caused it; with less certainty, but nevertheless
reasonable assurance, we also know the body politic is ill-served both by false
information and by the chilling effect the libel rules have on the decision to
enter public life. Reputation cannot be served by increased numbers of rules
that both make it more difficult for plaintiffs to get to juries and push truth
further from the central aspect of a trial.
Conversely, press and public interests cannot be served as long as damage
verdicts can go through the sky. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. stated compensation
without injury was unconstitutional, but it left glaring loopholes open with
both punitive damages and compensation for mental anguish (a harm that
71
flows by definition from libel).
$20,000.67

67.
68.
Smolla,
69.
70.
71.

Bezanson, Crandell & Soloski, Libel Law and the Press at 178 (cited in note 63).
See Green v Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 107 Ill App 3d 755, 438 NE2d 201 (1982); Rodney
Suing the Press 74 (Oxford U Press, 1986).
Powe, The Fourth Estate at 121-24, 126-27, 130-31 (cited in note 7).
Gertz, 418 US at 342-43; Powe, The Fourth Estate at 136 (cited in note 7).
Gertz, 418 US at 349-50.
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A central problem of libel is that there is no rational way for the parties to
calculate how much a case is worth. 7 2 While it is inconceivable to think of a
person harmed by words to be damaged in excess of $1 million for mental
anguish, that is how the rules allow juries to assess damages-even though
Gertz had purported to limit damages to injury. The lottery nature of the few
large winners and the loss sustained by the few large losers is then
compounded by the fact that punitive damages are inevitable if the New York
Times actual malice standard is met. 73

When the potential recovery is

unlimited, both sides are likely to spend more in litigation costs than the case
is actually worth. Realistic damages would limit defense spending, the single
largest factor in libel costs, and thereby serve well as a means of reducing the
chill of litigation. Bringing reality to damages, coupled with an end to the
actual malice requirement-thereby allowing juries to find truth rather than
wrongdoing by an arrogant and seemingly unchecked defendant-could
restore the balance that New York Times articulated and serve both the public
and the press.
D.

Privacy

The dignity tort of invasion of privacy by publication, from its inception by
Warren and Brandeis 7 4 to protect Warren's gala dinner parties from public
view, 7 5 to the present, appeals more to the affluent than other segments of
society. Privacy has never done as well in the courts as in the legal journals.
Typically, for recognition, privacy must combine with a second value of some
importance. The need for second chances for middle class juvenile offenders
or the stigma associated with being raped are currently popular second
values. Even in these situations, the harms from disclosure may be insufficient
to override the public interest in accurate information.
When the Miami Herald trailed Gary Hart and Donna Rice to Hart's
Georgetown townhouse and then published what it purported to find, no
potential lawsuit was mentioned. There was an ethical debate about both the
Herald's tactics and its choice to publish the article, but the public had no
doubt about the relevancy of the information. Hart's frontrunning candidacy
was over. He may have had, as he kept protesting, the best ideas for leading
the nation, but voters wanted nothing more of him. Because some voters
would undoubtedly find any information relevant to the decision of whether to
elect public officials, it would be shocking if the Court recognized any privacy
interest on such officials' behalf.
When one shifts from public officials to private individuals, the balance
also shifts, but even here the Court has always protected the press in its
publication of legally acquired information. Thus, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,76 a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Anderson, 140 U Pa L Rev at 515 (cited in note 61).
Id at 514; Powe, The Fourth Estate at 124 (cited in note 7).
Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193 (1890).
Don Pember, Privacy and the Press 23 (U Washington Press, 1972).
491 US 524, 532-36 (1989).
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civil privacy case, the Court set aside a damages award for negligent
publication of a rape victim's name because the newspaper had lawfully
obtained the information through government disclosure. The Court
recognized, as it had previously, that the state is in the best position to protect
against disclosure through careful internal procedures. Yet, as Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing7 7 shows, even careful internal procedures cannot prevent a
newspaper from acquiring information about public crimes, such as that
newspaper did when one junior high school student murdered a classmate in
school. The Court offered a pair of rationales in protecting the paper,
essentially relegating the child's privacy interest. As with Florida Star,
however, the Court left open the possibility that on other facts that privacy
interest might prevail.
Florida Star and Smith may be usefully contrasted with Seattle Times v.
Rhinehart,78 where the Court held that information acquired by the press in
state-mandated discovery for litigation cannot be published unless the
information actually comes out in the litigation. Rhinehart's balance
demonstrates that there are some circumstances where it is too unfair to allow
the press to publish (without sanction) information it possesses. Perhaps one
may extrapolate from Rhinehart that if the press broke into property and
pillaged files or planted eavesdropping devices, and later published, then the
publication could also be penalized. Just as a second reinforcing value, such
as the stigma associated with being a rape victim, may be necessary for initial
state recognition of the privacy claim, so it appears that privacy will also need
a second reinforcing interest, such as illegal acquisition, for its harm to be
deemed sufficient to override the first amendment right to publish truthful
information.
E.

Obscenity

Ever since the Court held that obscenity and sexual explicitness are not
synonymous, 79 it has been baffled by two related, but largely unanswered,
questions: What is obscene, and why? The latter pertains directly to harm.
The Court generally has found little or no credible research tying obscenity to
legitimately regulatable harm. Recently, research has shown violent
pornography may cause harm,8 0 but there is little correlation between violent
pornography and the Court's definition of what is suppressible.
77. 443 US 97, 104-06 (1978).
78. 467 US 20, 37 (1984).
79. Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 487 (1957).
80. See Edward Donnerstein & Leonard Berkowitz, Victim Reactions in Aggressive Erotic Films as a
Factor in Violence against Women, 41 J Personality & Soc Psychology 710 (1981); Neil M. Malamuth &
Edward Donnerstein, eds, Pornography and Social Aggression (Academic Press, 1984). Donnerstein's
work is frequently cited as evidence of pornography's negative social impacts." Margaret H.
Thompson, Steven H. Chaffee & Hayg H. Oshgan, Regulating Pornography, 40J Communication 73, 74
(1990). A prime example is the so-called "Meese Commission" Report, the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography Final Report which states there is a link between sexual aggression and
non-violent, but degrading, depictions of women. Attorney General's Commission on Pornography,
Final Report 330 (US GPO, 1986)("Meese Commission Report"). Yet Donnerstein "has repeatedly
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If obscenity, but not necessarily sexual explicitness, is suppressible, then
there must be some way to distinguish the obscene from the merely frank.
Although Justice Stewart made himself an object of derision with his famous
81 definition of hard core
"I know it when I see it"
pornography as obscenity,
the Court has not done much better in providing a definition. It essentially
copied Stewart's position and established a policy of reversing obscenity
convictions without offering justification for its practice. 8 2 In attempting to
define obscenity, whether in Roth,8 3 Memoirs, 84 or Miller,8 5 the Court has fared
little better because it is all but impossible to define a constitutional line with
words that have lost their meaning (and probably were inherently vague
before that). In the mid-1980s, the most helpful the justices could be in
clarifying the meaning of obscenity was to state that it does not include
materials appealing to a normal, as opposed to a shameful or morbid, interest
86
in sex.
The Court did not match its difficulties in definition with similar difficulties
in explanation, largely because it rarely has tried to explain why obscenity
could be proscribed. Indeed, until the 1980s' crusade against child
pornography, the Court's explanation for why obscenity may be proscribed
has never matched the reasons offered by the proponents of suppression.8 7
Nor can the Court take much credit for its one correct match regarding child
pornography, since most controversies about regulating obscenity have
nothing to do with children. One rationale offered for the regulation of
obscenity was that it is sin.8 8 In a companion case to Miller,8 9 the Court
offered a vague "quality of life" rationale that could apply to everything or
nothing. More recently, when radical feminists decided that pornography was

stressed that sexually explicit films have undesirable effects only when sex is mixed with violence."
Thompson, Chaffee & Oshgan, Regulating Pornography at 74 (cited in this note)(emphasis added).
Donnerstein, who had testified to the Meese Commission that there were no studies linking
aggressive behavior and non-violent pornography, reacted to the contrary conclusions of the
Commission by labelling them "bizarre." Philip Shenon, A Second Opinion on Pornography'sImpact, NY
Times 4-8 col 3 (May 18, 1986). As Dr. Judith Becker, an associate professor of clinical psychology
at Columbia University, noted in her dissent from the Commission's conclusions, they were
attempting "to tease the current data [which did not deal with non-violent depictionsI into proof of a
causal link [and this] simply cannot be accepted." Meese Commission Report at 204 (cited in this
note).

81. Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197 (1963)(Stewart concurring).
82. Redrp v New York, 386 US 767 (1967); Miller v California, 413 US 15, 22 n3 (1973)(Court
began practice of summarily reversing convictions when majority of members, applying separate
tests, found first amendment protection).
83. 354 US at 487-91.
84. .A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a J'oman of Pleasure" v Massachusetts, 383 US 413, 41820 (1966).
85. 413 US at 23-26.
86. Brockett v Spokane Arcades, 472 US 491, 498 (1985).
87. New Iork v Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982).
88. Louis Henkin, .Moralsand the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum L Rev 391 (1963).
89. Paris Adult Theater I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 58 (1973).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. I

patriarchy, and convinced cities to agree by passing legislation prohibiting it,
the Court sacked their handiwork without even hearing oral argument. 90
The Court can neither define obscenity nor offer a rationale for its
suppression. Does it cause sin or is it sin? Does it cause exploitation and
domination of women or is it the exploitation and domination of women?
Does it cause societal blight or is it a societal blight? Those who would
regulate obscenity are sure of the answers (although they would disagree with
each other), while those who are skeptical await some credible explanation
and perhaps evidence of harm. The Court, hiding behind the last refuge of its
discredited Chaplinsky91 approach, whereby expression deemed outside the
first amendment can be regulated for any or no reason at all, is unlikely to
require answers. As a result, obscenity, which causes less demonstrable harm
than the other areas surveyed above, can nevertheless be regulated far more
extensively.
While the harms from obscenity are more diffuse and vague than those
coming from national security breaches, invasions of privacy, or defamation,
the Court has perceived that the benefits from borderline obscenity cases are
equally diffuse and vague, and maybe even nonexistent. 92 Greenmoss Builders,9 3
a libel suit involving an erroneous credit report, took a similar approach. It is
conceivable, then, that a compelling case of invasion of privacy, without any
attempt to link it to a public issue, might receive like treatment. However, in
both libel and privacy, the Court begins with the assumption that the
expression has value.
Sexual expression is viewed differently. Although lacking empirical proof
of harm, those who would suppress it have substituted the fervor of certainty.
The Court's line-drawing has been consistently questioned by various local
government units operating on the view that, the Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, they should suppress frank descriptions and depictions of
sex. There has been a thirty-year guerrilla war between the Court and those
disagreeing, where the latter have devoted considerable efforts to breaking
the Court's boundaries and chilling, if not stifling, materials that the Court
would protect. While the Court's response has been mixed, it has recognized
frontal attacks on its position for what they are. Thus, both Georgia's attempt
to label the critically-acclaimed movie Carnal Knowledge as hard core
pornography 94 and Indianapolis's effort to rid its marketplace of all sexual
materials that were unacceptable to radical feminists or fundamentalist
90. American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd, 475 US 1001
(1986)(definition of pornography in ordinance as graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
and reference to particular depictions, violated first amendment).
91. Chaplsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572 (1942)(there are well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which do not raise any constitutional
problem).
92. Renton v Playtime Theaters, 475 US 41 (1986); FiV/PBS, Inc. v Dallas, 110 S Ct 596, 617
(1990)(Scalia dissenting).
93. Dun & Bradstreet v Greenmoss Builders, 472 US 749 (1985).
94. Jenkins v Georgia, 418 US 153 (1974).
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ministers were invalidated. 95 When local governments have attempted to
reach materials that have substantive content in addition to an emphasis on
sex, the Court has successfully blocked their efforts. Thus, despite strong
local challenges to its policy regarding sexual expression, the Court has
confirmed its position by striking those attempts that unmistakably cross the
line of permissible regulation.
III
REGULATING MARKET POWER

In Buckley v. Valeo, 96 the Court's initial campaign finance decision, the

Court stated that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... .. 97 Were that statement
accurate, this would be a very short section. While it is entirely accurate for
newspapers, it is almost as inaccurate for broadcasting. The statement is also
no longer correct even in the area in which it was made.
A.

Newspapers

Writing about the press after a three-year study during the mid-1940s, the
Hutchins Commission, named after its chair, Robert Maynard Hutchins,
stated that "[t]he right of free public expression has . . . lost its earlier
reality." '9 8 Subsequent events only underscored this conclusion. The number
of daily newspapers, which had been dropping throughout this century, has
declined even further today. New daily newspapers in urban areas have
proven financially impossible to sustain. Thus, most cities have become single
newspaper monopolies, many of which, in turn, have been acquired by
newspaper chains. Local competition has vanished and many observers
believe diversity has diminished. 9 9
The Miami Herald demonstrated the influence of market power by savaging
a candidate for state representative in pre-election editorials and refusing to
print his response, as a long-standing but unused state law required. 0 0 The
candidate, Pat Tornillo, lost the election and ascribed his defeat to the unfair
intervention of the dominant newspaper and its refusal to allow him access, as
required by law, to reach the voters in his district with a response putting the
facts in perspective.' 0 '
Tornillo prevailed in the Florida Supreme Court, which linked the
empirical reality of increased concentration of ownership of mass
95.
96.
97.
98.
1947).
99.
100.
101.

Hudnut, 475 US 1001.
424 US i (1976).
Id at 48-49.
The Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press 16 (U Chicago Press,
Powe, The Fourth Estate at 201-03 (cited in note 7).
liami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 243 (1974).
L. A. PoweJr., Tornillo, 1987 S Ct Rev 345, 367-72.
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communications to a public service theory of the press. The Court stated that
"[flreedom of expression was retained by the people through the First
Amendment for all the people and not merely for a select few."' 0 2 Public
debate could not be left entirely in the hands of "just those who have invested
money in the publishing business."' 0 3 Whatever rights a newspaper has to
initiate discussion about an electoral contest, once it has, the state can require
that the discussion present both sides.
The Herald's behavior during Tornillo's candidacy was copied by the press
nationally while the case was pending in the United States Supreme Court.
Having both the willingness and the means to defend its prerogatives, the
press wrote column after column, editorial after editorial, on the importance
of reversing the Florida decision. 0 4 Materials supporting the Florida decision
and the right of reply never entered the public debate, however, because the
media had an interest in suppressing them. While this may have kept the
public appropriately informed in the eyes of the press, briefs and oral
argument told the Court both sides of the controversy. After agreeing with
the reality of newspaper concentration, the Court nevertheless sustained the
press position. The right to reply law was found unconstitutional because it
would chill the newspaper's willingness to enunciate its views and because the
0 5
Constitution places editorial choice in the hands of press editors.1
Tornillo guarantees that a major publication in the marketplace cannot be
toned down or made to cover specific issues, even if it is spending too much
time on one side of one issue or covering certain issues insufficiently. In a test
of the idea that the marketplace can be made better by modest regulation, the
Court disallowed the experiment. Yet this result was hardly surprising.
Freedom of the press had always meant lack of regulation. What had changed
was the nature of the industry combined with the alluring analogy of
broadcast regulation. Broadcast regulation had made print regulation
thinkable.
B.

Broadcasting

From broadcasting's very inception, Congress, regulators, and the Court
believed that it was not entitled to the constitutional protections accorded the
print media.' 0 6 Ultimately, the constitutional status of broadcasting has
presented the Court with two questions: first, whether there is a relevant
constitutional distinction between broadcasting and print; and, second, if
there is a distinction, whether a different and appropriate first amendment
theory is available for application. In NBC v. United States, 1° 7 the Court held
that there is a constitutional distinction; then, reaffirming its ATBC holding, the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Tornillo v Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So2d 78, 83 (Fla 1973).
Idat91.
Powe, The Fourth Estate at 270-71 (cited in note 7).
Tornillo, 418 US at 257-58.
Powe, American Broadcasting and the First Amendment at 13-30 (cited in note 2).
319 US 192 (1943).
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Court elaborated its view of appropriate constitutional theory for analyzing
broadcasting cases in Red Lion Broadcastingv. FCC.'0 8
The Court's conclusion that there is a constitutional distinction between
broadcasting and print is based on the familiar assumption that broadcasting
is an inherently scarce resource. 10 9 Necessarily implicit in this conclusion is
the proposition that print is not an inherently scarce resource. Not
surprisingly, the Court has not explained why land, ore, trees, or newsprint
are not scarce resources while the electromagnetic spectrum is. All are
limited; none can be multiplied except over time. Nor has the Court noted
that for almost the entire twentieth century, the number of daily newspapers
has been on a steady decline 1 0 while the number of broadcast outlets has
been increasing constantly and sometimes dramatically, as seen on the day the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") created 684 new frequency
modulated ("FM") stations in 48 states.''I
Instead of looking at the facts, the Court has taken refuge in theory. Based
on the events of the 1920s, it assumed initially that without regulation there
would be chaos because too many people would broadcast on the same
frequency and no one could be heard." 2 However, that confused the
necessity to space broadcasters via a property rights mechanism with the need
to regulate their speech. After all, if everyone wrote on the same piece of
paper, it too would be unintelligible. The Court later asserted that more
people want broadcast licenses than can have them.'' 3 However, it never
paused to note that the reason for the excess demand is that broadcast
licenses are highly valuable yet given away at no cost. If newspapers were
given away gratuitously, there would also be more individuals wanting them
than could have them. The Court's assertion of scarcity is simply silly. While
scarcity may have made sense a half-century ago, few, outside of the Supreme
4
Court justices, have taken it seriously in years.''
Furthermore, the Court never explains why scarcity matters. If one
assumes that the justices know better, as Tornillo suggests they may, then
clinging to the scarcity argument might make sense so long as the purpose is to
authorize regulation of those means of communication that are more
powerful than print. Essentially the Court has authorized an updated copying
of the Tudor-Stuart response to the introduction of the printing press, which
was to try to domesticate it by bringing print under royal prerogative.'' 5 If
broadcasting is also perceived as potentially destabilizing, then its regulation
can be supported for similar reasons. Indeed, once power is substituted for
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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115.
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395 US 367 (1969).
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NBC, 319 US at 212.
Red Lion, 395 US at 388-89.
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scarcity, broadcast regulation makes much more sense.' 16 Viewers and
listeners choose what to hear everyday, from newspapers to books to street
corner discussions to television. If broadcasting lacked power, the choice
exercised daily by viewers and listeners would seemingly be a sufficient
safeguard without the added governmental paternalism to protect listeners
from broadcast programming they do not wish to hear. The sovereign
prerogative of choice is ignored because of the specter of market failure, the
necessity of corrective supervision, and the fear of unforeseen consequences.
That there is a constitutional distinction between broadcasting and print is
most apparent in Red Lion's validation of the fairness doctrine, which requires
broadcasters to give adequate coverage to significant public issues and to
ensure that such coverage is fair in that it accurately presents conflicting views
on those issues. 117 The fairness doctrine encapsulated a journalistic code of
ethics to which most reporters and publishers, in all media, profess
allegiance. 18 Nevertheless, as Tornillo held, the idea of fairness is enforced
internally rather than by the legal system in all other media; for the
nonbroadcast media, the first amendment mandates that the government
leave issues of fairness to editors and readers, not to judges. Not so for the
broadcast media. The Court has concluded here that the rights of viewers and
listeners are paramount. Furthermore, because viewers and listeners cannot
directly exercise their rights, a governmental body is necessary to supervise
broadcasting and ensure that each speaker operates according to a
governmentally designed public interest standard. Under the fairness
doctrine, it is not a defense for a broadcaster to note the availability of the
views at issue in either the print media or on other broadcast outlets. Rather,
each broadcaster has an individualized duty to provide the necessary
information in the public interest, even if that means replicating existing
information and consequently denying the public alternatives." 19
The fairness doctrine provided grounds for legal challenges to
broadcasters who presented controversial programming. Even if the
challenges ultimately failed, the questioning of editorial decisions where the
law mandated an answer from the editor not only imposed costs in time and
legal fees, but also carried the dim possibility of loss of license. 2 0° There were
no similar costs to a broadcaster for avoiding controversy. It is widely
believed that that is exactly what some broadcasters did. 12 1 While Red Lion
denied the existence of a chilling effect, it also stated that if one existed the
FCC could do something about it. 1 22 Both statements fit the power rationale:
116. Powe, American Broadcasting and the First Amendment 210-15 (cited in note 2).
117. 395 US at 375-79.
118. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., The FairnessDoctrine Today, 1985 Duke L J 151,
152-53.
119. Rep. Patsy Mink, 59 FCC2d 987 (1976); Brandywine-Main Line Radio v FCC, 473 F2d 16 (DC
Cir, 1972).
120. Krattenmaker & Powe, 1985 Duke LJ at 158-59 (cited in note 118).
121. Idat 158.
122. 395 US at 396.
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a chill on a destabilizing medium could be welcomed as a benefit, and
government supervision of how broadcasters respond to the chill ensures that
the response will not be too hot.
The Court rejected its traditional first amendment assumptions of
consumer choice and inherent governmental partisanship and instead created
new ones supposedly tailored to the nature of the medium and its supposed
power. The Court assumed that by creating newly tailored constitutional
doctrine it could make broadcasting "function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment." 123 Presumably, broadcasting otherwise
would not so function. Had the Court succeeded, there might have been
grounds for reconsidering the traditional first amendment assumptions in
nonbroadcast contexts, and Tornillo could have gone the other way.
The traditional assumptions do apply to broadcasting. The first
amendment theory for broadcasting created by the Court has resulted in
partisan application of neutral regulations, allowed a chilling effect, and
124
denied to viewers and listeners their supposedly sovereign right of choice.
With the FCC's 1987 repeal of the fairness doctrine, which the Court let pass
without review,' 2 5 the key underpinning of regulation limiting broadcast
power has been removed. Because the Court never formally embraced
power, using scarcity as a synonym instead, the Court can pretend the power
theory never existed, and recognize the obsolescence of scarcity simply by
announcing changed circumstances. Then, again, it need not do so; at least
the swings in first amendment theory for campaign finance suggest it may not.
C.

Campaign Finance

The framework of the debates on the constitutionality of various campaign
26
finance reforms was in place before the Court decided Buckley v. Valeo.'
Reform has sought to limit contributions to candidates to prevent the
purchasing of media access and the consequent appearance of impropriety,
and to control the escalating cost of running for office. The primary cost of
any campaign is the attempt to influence voters. For some, this fact is both
the beginning and the end of the analysis: limiting money limits speech and is
therefore unconstitutional. 27 For others, there was a brief moment of denial
that money had anything to do with what it was spent on and that therefore
the first amendment, if applicable at all, was of only marginal interest. 128 This
denial was eliminated by Buckley. Since Buckley, proponents of reform have
countered the simple first amendment view espoused by those opposing
money limitations by arguing that some individuals are more prone to
contributing to political campaigns than others, leading to too much speech of
C

123.
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a certain viewpoint. These individuals unduly influence the debate, skewing

the choice of candidates and the choice of policies supported by elected
officials. Proponents, point out that by limiting the amount of money that can
be expended, campaign finance reform would limit the market power of these
individuals and enhance that of others less inclined to contribute to political
campaigns. Proponents argue that it is, therefore, only appropriate to give
1 29
deference to legislative solutions capping contributions and expenditures.
In many respects Buckley split all the major differences. It erected a rigid
constitutional distinction between contributions and expenditures. A
contribution could be regulated because it could lead to an appearance (and
reality) of corruption of the process. Candidate expenditures could not be
regulated because the only real interest in limiting them was to limit speech
since candidates could not corrupt themselves. The same held true for
individual expenditures not coordinated through a campaign. The Court
understood that an entirely new meaning of freedom of speech would have to
be established to criminalize a quarter-page ad placed by an individual in a
major newspaper stating, "Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon, Vote for
Jimmy Carter." Thus the Court held, "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
1 30
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."
Subsequent cases added twists to this approach, namely that ballot
initiatives presented pure speech issues and corporations presented
problems. Both were present in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,' 3 '
where Massachusetts attempted to limit corporate spending on a personal
income tax initiative. Quoting Buckley, the Court again rejected the idea of
leveling down 1 3 2 and held that precluding corporations from entering the
public debate was unconstitutional. Subsequently, the Court's position that
corruption was not a potential danger in non-candidate circumstances was
underscored by striking down an effort in Berkeley, California to prevent
33
landlords from attempting to purchase too many ads about rent control.
The Court's most recent foray into campaign finance, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,' 34 challenges several seemingly established points. The
Chamber, a nonprofit corporation funded by annual dues from member
businesses (three quarters of which are for-profit corporations), wished to
place a newspaper ad in favor of a specific candidate for the state house of
representatives. The funding was to be independent of the candidate's
campaign. Had the Chamber been a media organization, there would have
129. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice
Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L Rev 505 (1982); Buckley, 424.US at 257 (White concurring
and dissenting separately); First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,
435 US 765, 802 (White dissenting).
130. Buckley, 424 US at 48-49.
131. 435 US 765 (1978).
132. Id at 790-91, quoting Buckley, 424 US at 48-49.
133. Citizens Against Rent Control v Berkeley, 454 US 290 (1981).
134. 110 S Ct 1391 (1990).
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been no question of its right to present its views fully;' 3 5 similarly, had it been
an individual, Buckley guaranteed the right to do so. Since the Chamber was
neither a media organization nor an individual, however, it had no such right.
Under Michigan state law, corporations are prohibited from using general
treasury funds in connection with candidate elections. The legislature feared
that allowing access to corporate treasuries would create an appearance of
corruption in the electoral process. In a retreat from its Bellotti decision, the
Court agreed.
In Bellotti, the Court had held that it was irrelevant that the speaker was a
corporation so long as the corporation's message was protected speech.
However, in Austin it found that it was relevant that the speaker was a
corporation, even if its message was protected speech. Austin held that a state
could prevent a corporation from speaking; to that extent, Bellotti is overruled.
Under Austin, a corporation may be precluded from saying what an individual
may say freely. However, that is hardly the most interesting aspect of the
decision; instead, we must look at what the Court has to say about the state's
rationale and power in the marketplace of ideas.
The rationale for Michigan's prohibition was to prevent actual corruption
or the appearance of corruption in the electoral process, but for the Court,
the latter was sufficient. 13 6 Finding that the prohibition had been
13 7
appropriately narrowly tailored, the Court found this interest compelling,
thus softening its notion of compelling interest. It allowed the requirement of
strong probabilities of harm to fade into possible misperceptions of harm.
But the Court did not stop at having watered-down the level of state interest
required for restricting speech. More significantly, the Court appears to have
concluded that limiting the impact of money on debate is, itself, a compelling
state interest. If this is an accurate interpretation, then the limited reading of
Austin as only undermining Bellotti must yield to a more general undermining
of Buckley.
The Court wrote that Michigan was targeting "a different type of
corruption."' 138 The legislature wished to prevent the "distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas."'' 39 This may be another way of saying
that Charles Lindblom was right in Politics and Markets 140 and that
corporations had been given too much in Bellotti. But, while "corporation"
appears twice in the sentence, 4 1 the language is more general. The sentence
makes perfectly good sense without "corporation," and there is no logical
135.
136.
137.
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reason why it must be limited to corporations. The Court's real conclusion is
that too much money distorts debate. It does not matter whether the money
comes from a corporation, inherited wealth (typically amassed through
corporations), hard work, luck, or undetected insider trading.
If someone with money wishes to spend it to persuade others to agree with
her positions, the "distorting" effects as well as the lack of correlation with
public support remain identical to those that would result from the Chamber's
spending. The Court's statement tying speech into preexisting support is
even more troublesome because it suggests that, before money can be used
for speech, the speech must correlate with what the public already believes.
What other plausible meaning could there be for the tying of distortion into
public support for political ideas? If the Chamber's candidate loses, then
there would be evidence of lack of support of the Chamber's views. But who
would care? It is only if the Chamber's candidate wins that problems arise.
Does victory validate correlation between the Chamber's views and those of
the body politic? Or would the victory mean that the Chamber had
successfully distorted the election with its ads? I assume it is the latter, and by
now the Court's definition of distortion is relatively clear: distortion seems
remarkably close to persuasion. Speech that changes views distorts and
therefore may be stopped. An old charge directed at the clear and present
danger test was that it stopped speech just as it was going to be effective in
leading to action. 1 42 Here, speech is stopped because it might be effective in
changing views. The motto for this approach may be described as "long live
the status quo."
Newspapers, however, can communicate as much and as freely as they
wish, even if the public does not share their views and even if they are
organized as a corporation. The Michigan law exempted them, as mandated
by Tornillo. Yet after Austin, Tornillo could be reconsidered emphasizing the
Miami Herald's distorting effect on the Miami voters who need not share their
dominant paper's views. I strongly doubt, however, whether there is reason

to believe the Court would intend anyone to take its logic seriously.
IV
CONCLUSION

Although its results are relatively clear, the Court has eschewed final
bright-line rules in dealing with each type of harm. The Court never settled
the national security publication problem and may not see the problem again
for years with the Cold War having ended. It has always discussed the harm
more than the redress for its infliction in privacy cases. Because the
information published in privacy cases is often relevant to some public issue,
the problem is likely to remain more ethical than legal. The Court has shown
no signs of changing its active libel intervention, which adds a complex
constitutional overlay to an already intricate web of common law rules. The
142.
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area begs for simplification and rationalization on verdicts, but it may prove in
no one's interest to push for change. Attorneys on both sides benefit from the
present system, and the press itself has probably learned to live with, and
insure under, the regime.
Libel and obscenity are different. Obscenity law has changed less over the
past two decades than societal attitudes. Although society now appears
willing to tolerate more restrictive legislation, the Court has made little
change in the law. Regardless of how receptive the Court will be, it allows
most regulation in this area to prevent harm even though the evidence of
actual harm is soft in comparison with other areas.
While initially done sub silentio in broadcasting, regulating to achieve some
market balance has become an integral part of the legal regime under which
mass communications function. Yet, once the Court starts down the road of
allowing regulation for balance, Tornillo creates an inherent instability insofar
as it leaves one very large market participant free to communicate as much as
it pleases: newspapers. If a person like William Loeb must always be able to
influence significantly the selection of the two presidential nominees because
of his ownership of the Manchester (NH) Union-Leader, it is difficult to explain
why Democrats, for example, ought to be limited in the information they wish
to circulate for the New Hampshire primary. 4 3 Yet, after nearly two decades
of campaign finance regulation, the reformers have never discussed how the
press fits in the overall picture and what sense it makes to limit all but the
largest participants.
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1

There is little doubt that a major intellectual impetus for campaign
regulation is the correct belief that the wealthy should not be able to use their
money as a surrogate for buying votes. Furthermore, the area may well
represent the entry-pushing wedge of Carolene Products' footnote four analysis
to the first amendment. 14 5 While footnote four's academic imperative to
protect the insufficiently protected was sweeping through the fourteenth
amendment, the first amendment remained impermeable. Footnote four had
expressly excluded it, and given the love of the. first amendment by those
academics writing about it, one could hardly expect to see exceptions being
advocated. 14 6 But as the wealthy acquire seemingly undue influence in debate
and the ignorant rekindle hate speech, the idea that all speakers should be
treated equally has come under question. 14 7 Footnote four offers an easy
answer: when in doubt, allow restraint of the powerful but protect the
disadvantaged.
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Campaign finance reform, just like the fairness doctrine, gets a lot of
mileage out of its name. The fairness doctrine has not been fair and
legislation offered as reform is not necessarily beneficial. The soothing
sounds of labels are poor substitutes for realities. When the Court allows the
legislature to determine that too much speech about an election campaign is
against the public interest-at least too much if a corporation is the one trying
to get the messages to the public-it may be less of a footnote four oriented
legislature protecting the disadvantaged than precisely what footnote four
warned against: use by those in political power to protect themselves against
49
the possibility of losing a future election.'
The mass communications cases have not only dealt with real harms, but
have also put into play the Court's traditional first amendment assumption
that even benign regulations of expression will afford partisan application.
Where the mass communications cases track the speech cases, as they do
when attempting to deal with harms caused by expression, they are closely
aligned even if some solutions could be improved. Where they split from the
50
speech cases and the assumption is relaxed, as in the broadcasting cases,'
they have thus far generated results more consistent with the traditional
assumption than the better world called for by the limiting regulation. The
area might gain some intellectual coherence by a frontal infusion of footnote
four, removing the cloak of benignness, and articulating why some speakers
should be toned down because their ideas have either too much or too little
support. Such an infusion hardly seems an encouraging prospect if this is,
indeed, what the future holds.
and the FCC's minority preference policies with a footnote four analysis that is free from the
doublespeak that often accompanies the idea of promoting speech through quieting some. See also
note 147.
149. Eule aptly states: "Political reality suggests that legislative pursuit of speaker diversity will
be rare. The American experience with speech infringements is stocked with attempts to suppress
dissent, not with efforts to promote it." 1990 S Ct Rev at 126 (cited in note 148). I agree fully,
indeed more so. The FCC's minority preference policies, sustained in Metro Broadcastingv FCC, 110 S
Ct 2997 (1990), were almost unique in their efforts to promote diversity by adding, rather than
subtracting, voices. And footnote four itself tells us this should be so. After all, if a group can
persuade the legislature to assist it, in what sense can the beneficiaries be classified as politically
powerless? Consider the other example of giving speech rights, Regan v Taxation with Representation,
461 US 540 (1983), where a "public interest" organization argued that it was denied fifth
amendment equal protection because it could not maintain tax exempt status while lobbying for its
causes, but veterans groups could. just what is it about veterans groups that allows them and them
alone to maintain IRS charitable status while engaging in substantial lobbying activities? Is it
because they are politically powerless? Or is it because, like minorities in the late-1980s (when
Congress forbid the FCC to reconsider its minority preferences), it has a fair amount of legislative
clout on the issue?
Not only do I believe that a grant of added rights is more likely to reflect political clout than
powerlessness, I also think that the typical case will be, like Austin, one where the legislature decides
to harm one group as a(n ostensible) way of helping another. It may well be that corporate interests
speak too much and have too much legislative clout, but I would be far more impressed by the
Michigan legislature if it attempted to finance all campaigns at a decent level of funding rather than
deciding that certain interests ought not be allowed to take out newspaper ads because if they do so
they may persuade voters to vote in a way they ought not.
150. See, for example, Red Lion, 395 US 367; see generally Powe, American Broadcastingand the First
Amendment at 108-90 (cited in note 2).

